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INTRODUCTION
Comparing incomparable things to each other is like trying to
compare apples and oranges. It may be surprising, but the
expenditure-to-GDP ratio of the general government
expenditure of the various countries also falls into a category
which is incomparable. In this article, we render the 2007
expenditures of the four Visegrád countries – the Czech
Republic, Poland, Hungary and Slovakia – comparable, as
much as possible, and review the factors which generate the
differences. In our analysis, we compare the expenditures for
2007, because this is the last year for which we have
sufficiently detailed figures available for each country
reviewed.
The comparability of general government expenditures is
hindered by several factors. In this article, we deal only with
those factors that have no impact on the deficit level, since
they have identical effects on both revenues and
expenditures. A typical example is the taxation of pensions,
which simultaneously increases revenues and expenditures
and hinders comparability with the countries where pensions
are tax-exempt. (N.B. Pensions are exempt from tax in most
countries.) Another example is that in countries where
income taxes and contributions on wages are higher, the
taxes paid by government employees may also contribute to
a higher level of expenditure via the contributions paid by
the government as the employer. Similarly, a higher VAT
rate may increase the government’s consumption and
investment expenditures, despite the fact that it has no
impact on the general government balance, since the original
unadjusted figures do not consolidate the consumption taxes
paid by the general government either. In these cases, the
government essentially puts money from one of its pockets
into the other. Moreover, if VAT and excise duty rates are
higher than in other countries, the budget receives higher
tax revenues as a secondary impact of the spending of
government transfers and the wages of the public sector. In
eliminating the impacts of differences in taxation, we relied
on the calculations of P. Kiss–Jedrzejowicz–Jirsákova
(2009), the closing year of which was 2007. We compare the
expenditures thus adjusted and the structure thereof in
several cross-sections. We compare adjusted Hungarian
expenditures with the average of the other three Visegrád
countries, and the other countries individually. The
rationale for this two-step approach is that – given the low
number of countries in the comparison – even a single
outlying value can distort the average considerably.
We do not, however, deal with factors that generate a
simultaneous temporary fluctuation of expenditures and
deficit. One such factor is the business cycle, which
automatically impacts unemployment benefits and wage
increase-indexed pension expenses on the expenditure side.
According to our estimates, however, the impact of the cycle
on these items was negligible in 2007. Creative accounting,
the purpose of which is to influence the deficit figures by
reducing expenditures temporarily, may potentially have a
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¸larger impact than the former. This article, however, does not
seek to perform a comprehensive survey thereof.
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Government expenditures reflect the government’s inputs,
but they do not provide any information on the output (or
outcome) achieved by such input. The underlying reason for
this is that – apart from the input volume – it depends on the
manner in which it is used and the incentives with which it is
used. For example, how the public wage system stimulates
better performance, or how funds are distributed amongst
the suppliers of the public services. Our comparison will not
touch upon these aspects, because government output cannot
be directly measured and the examination of public spending
efficiency and the targeted nature would go beyond the scope
of our analysis.
COMPARABLE EXPENDITURE LEVEL
In this article, we deal with the adjustment of the expenditure
levels of 2007 published by Eurostat, using the results
obtained by P. Kiss–Jedrzejowicz–Jirsákova (2009) as basis.
BASIC ADJUSTMENTS
As part of the basic adjustments, from the original
expenditure levels we deduct the interest expenses
determined in part by the volume of government debt, and in
part by the risk premium also connected to the former.
Thereafter, we adjust for sickness benefits paid by employers
“on behalf of the government” and for family tax allowances,
which are similar to expenditures. Finally, we deduct the
primary tax content of government expenditures, i.e. the
government expenditures paid by the government to itself. In
this manner, we obtain the net primary expenditures.
Firstly, we deduct interest expenses from the expenditures,
thus obtaining the category of primary expenditures. Interest
expenses interfere with comparison, because they mostly
depend not on fiscal policy decisions, but rather on debts
accumulated in the past, and are also influenced by the
inflation compensation included in interest payments and
debt denomination (foreign currency vs. domestic currency).
In 2007, Hungary’s interest expenditure exceeded the
average of the other Visegrád countries by 2.4 % of GDP.
Two-thirds of the difference is attributable to the higher
debt level, and one-third to higher yields. As our debt-to-
GDP ratio presumably will converge more slowly to the
Visegrád countries’ average, the higher interest expenses
should be offset with other items. In order to achieve this,
fiscal policy may opt for specific spending cuts or revenue
increases.
Secondly, we perform two adjustments simultaneously
impacting revenues and expenditures (P. Kiss–Jedrzejowicz–
Jirsákova, 2009). In the case of Slovakia, we consider the
family allowance incorporated into the income tax system,
which represents a transfer that does not belong in the
revenue side, as expenditure rather than “negative” revenue,
since it is independent of the prevailing tax liability. (This
means that tax might also be negative, which is impossible in
the case of tax allowances dependant on tax liability). We
simultaneously recognise the employer-paid part of the
sickness benefit as an expenditure and revenue (on a gross
basis), which we may interpret as one paid by the employer
“on behalf” of the government. Accordingly, this would be
equivalent to the government’s paying this part of the
sickness benefit as well from the tax collected from the
employer for this purpose.
Thirdly (based on P. Kiss–Jedrzejowicz–Jirsákova, 2009), we
deduct the tax content of the general government
expenditures from primary expenditures, namely income tax
and contributions paid on wages and certain transfers, i.e.
direct taxes, as well as indirect taxes paid on the general
governments’ investment expenditure and on its purchase of
goods and services, i.e. the VAT, excise and vehicle
registration tax. All these may be interpreted in a way that the
government puts money from one pocket into the other one.
In countries where the tax rates are lower, the tax “paid by
the government to itself” – thus the total revenues and total
expenditures – is also lower. While Hungary exceeded the
average of the three Visegrád countries (V3) by 10.1
percentage points in terms of total expenditures to GDP, the
difference at the level of primary expenditures is 7.7
percentage points, and the difference in the case of
expenditures net of tax content is 5.7 percentage points. 1.7
percentage points of the difference in the primary
expenditures is attributable to the different tax content, while
0.3 percentage point thereof is due to the adjustment for
negative tax and sickness benefit (See Table 1).
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1 For example, the government constantly underfunds certain public transport companies, then it periodically settles their accumulated debts. Current expenditures
are thus recognised subsequently as capital expenditures. The opposite takes place in the case of public-private partnership investments (PPP), where the capital
expenditure of the investments does not appear, but on the other hand the instalments and the interest payments increase current expenditures over the long run.
¸
¸
¸It is worth considering the background of the tax content,
which is 1.7 percentage points higher. For this purpose, we
separate the impact of the differences in the tax base (wage,
intermediate consumption, investment spending, and certain
transfers) and the effective tax burden thereon (measured as
tax divided by this tax base).
The tax base in Hungary is lower than the V3 average by
0.6%, thus the difference in tax content is entirely attributable
to the higher effective tax rate. We examined the amount of
tax that would be paid in the individual countries on the
primary expenditure if the V3 average effective tax base were
used in each country and only the tax burden differed.
Likewise, we also examined what the tax content in the
individual countries would be, if the tax burden was identical
and the difference existed only in the tax bases (Table 2).
The problem is that the use of the V3 average for the
calculation conceals Poland’s extremely large tax base. This
is due to the fact that while in the rest of the countries
pension payments are exempted from tax and
contributions, in Poland public dues exceeding 2% of GDP
are paid on pensions. Since this also distorts the V3 average,
the difference may also be analysed country by country.
Thus, for example, tax paid in Hungary on primary
expenditures exceeds that paid in Slovakia by almost 4% of
GDP. Of this difference, 1.6 percentage points is due to
difference in the effective tax burden and 2.3 percentage
points is attributable to the difference in the tax base. In
other words, if the Slovakian tax rates were applied,
expenditures to GDP would be 1.6 percentage points lower
in Hungary.
SUPPLEMENTARY ADJUSTMENTS
The first three steps of the adjustments led us to the category
of net primary expenditure. However, this still does not
render the results listed in Table 1 directly comparable. We
need further three supplementary adjustments, which are
valid only under certain assumptions and which are more
difficult to quantify than the earlier ones.
On the one hand, the fact that public expenditures also have
further, indirect (second round) impacts on tax revenues
should be considered (P. Kiss–Jedrzejowicz–Jirsákova,
2009). Namely, the wages of public employees and
household transfers also constitute part of the disposable
income of households. Households consume the vast
majority of this and pay consumption taxes on it. If
households consume their total income received from the
government, then this tax content in Hungary exceeds the
V3 average by 0.4% of GDP (Table 3).
2 This is explained by
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2 If households consumed only 90% of government-paid incomes in each country, the difference would decrease only to 0.36% of GDP from 0.4%. However, if the V3
average was 90%, while it remained 100% in Hungary, this difference would be 0.15% of GDP.
2007 (as a percentage of GDP) SK PL CZ V3 HU HU–V3
1. ESA expenditure 34.6 42.0 42.6 39.7 49.8 10.1
2. Interest expenses -1.4 -2.4 -1.1 -1.6 -4.0 -2.4
3. Primary adjusted expenditures (1–2)  33.2 39.6 41.5 38.1 45.8 7.7
4. Adjustment by negative tax, sickness benefit 0.9 0.2 0.1 0.4 0.1 -0.3
5. Tax and contribution content of expenditures -3.6 -7.7 -6.1 -5.8 -7.5 -1.7
6. Net primary expenditures (3+4+5) 30.5 32.1 35.5 32.7 38.4 5.7
Table 1
Three steps of the basic adjustment
2007 (as a percentage of GDP) SK PL CZ V3 HU HU–V3
1. Tax base 13.2 33.2 19.3 21.9 21.3 -0.6
2. Effective tax rate (per cent) 27.6 23.3 31.4 26.6 35.2 8.7
3. Primary tax and contribution content of 
expenditures (1*2) 3.6 7.7 6.1 5.8 7.5 1.7
3/a in case of V3 average tax rate  3.5 8.8 5.1 5.8 5.7 -0.2
3/b in case of V3 average tax base 6.0 5.1 6.9 5.8 7.7 1.9
Table 2
Breakdown of the primary tax adjustments into tax rate- and tax base-related impacts
¸the tax base which is by almost 4 percentage points higher,
i.e. by the higher general government expenditure (wages
and transfers). On the other hand, however, the
consumption tax rate used as the basis for the calculations
in the study is more than 1 percentage point lower in
Hungary than the V3 average. Thus, overall, both the
primary tax content and that indirect tax content –
emerging in household consumption – are higher in
Hungary than the average of the other Visegrád countries.
However, in the case of the primary tax content the
difference is attributable to the higher tax rate, while in the
case of the indirect expenditures to the higher tax base. The
apparent contradiction is due to the fact that while wage-
related taxes and contributions are dominant in primary
taxes, and in Hungary the effective tax burden of income is
higher than the V3 average, in the case of indirect taxes –
i.e. those realised through consumption – effective tax rates
are lower, despite the similar tax rates, due to the higher
degree of tax evasion in Hungary.
Another factor hindering comparison is the impact of net EU
funds. Contributions to the EU budget on the expenditure
side are only slightly different relative to GDP in the
countries surveyed. Expenditures covered by EU revenues
represent a larger difference. The adjustment of this can be
justified, if we consider the expenditures covered by EU
revenues as additional expenditure, i.e. as automatic extra
expenditures, which, however, do not replace expenditures
funded from own resources.
3 The difference in EU revenues
flowing through the general government is partially
attributable to the fact that EU revenues are allocated
variably between the private sector and the general
government in the individual countries, and the private sector
often receives its subsidies directly, without government
involvement. In this sense, only a small part of the same
volume of EU revenues may emerge as public expenditure in
one country, and a much larger part in another. In order to
eliminate this, we adjust the net primary expenditure by the
difference between payments to and revenues from the EU
budget. In Hungary, net EU revenues exceed the V3 average
by 0.3% of GDP, explaining this part of the discrepancy in
expenditures (Table 4).
Last but not least, the amount of sales and fee revenues
collected by the general government concerning certain
public services also differs, and thus, it is reasonable to adjust
expenditures for this as well. As a result, the adjusted
expenditures include only the net – i.e. those not covered by
revenues – expenditures. In this case, this means that direct
co-payments made by users can be expressly matched with
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2007 (as a percentage of GDP) SK PL CZ V3 HU HU–V3
1. Tax base 15.6 18.1 16.1 16.6 20.4 3.8
2. Effective tax rate (per cent) 14.1 18.7 12.7 15.1 14.0 -1.1
3. Indirect tax and contribution content of 
expenditures (1*2) 2.2 3.4 2.0 2.5 3.0 0.4
3/a in case of V3 average tax rate 2.4 2.7 2.4 2.5 3.1 0.6
3/b in case of V3 average tax base 2.3 3.1 2.1 2.5 2.3 -0.2
Table 3
Breakdown of the indirect tax adjustments into tax rate- and tax base-related impacts
2007 (as a percentage of GDP) SK PL CZ V3 HU HU–V3
6. Net primary expenditures 30.5 32.1 35.5 32.7 38.4 5.7
7. Indirect tax content of expenditure -2.2 -3.4 -2.0 -2.5 -3.0 -0.4
8. Net EU funds 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.1 -0.2 -0.3
9. Sales and user fee revenues -1.0 -2.5 -2.7 -2.1 -2.9 -0.8
10. Adjusted net primary expenditure 
(6+7+8+9) 27.7 26.2 30.8 28.2 32.4 4.1
Table 4
Three steps of the supplementary adjustment
4
3This assumption does not necessarily hold true, because while EU funds are gradually increasing, capital expenditures still do not exceed the previous years' average
in either of the countries.
4The numbering of the items in the table is continued from Table 1, as the final result of the basic adjustments is the starting point of the supplementary adjustments.part of the expenditures. However, this not only depends on
what price is requested for which range of services, but also
which range of institutions is included in the statistical
coverage of the government sector and which range is
accounted for outside the government sector.
Let us examine, for example, the case of Hungarian Railway
(MÁV). The operating cost and investment expenditures, as
well as the sales revenues of the rail company are recognised
outside the general government, and the budget only
includes the subsidies granted to it, which cover – to some
extent – the difference between MÁV’s expenditures and
revenues. As of the second half of 2007, part of MÁV
(MÁV Start which operates passenger transport) was added
to the government sector in a statistical sense, and
accordingly its expenditures and revenues stated in the
accounts on a gross basis. This means that if we fail to
reduce expenditures by the sales and fee revenues, then
neither the time series, nor the expenditures of the other
countries where railways are not part of the government
sector will be comparable.
Another example is accounting for healthcare and education
institutions. In Hungary, the majority of these institutions
belong to the government sector, thus their total expenditures
and sales and fee revenues are included in the accounts on a
gross basis. As opposed to this, in other countries the ratio of
institutions managed outside the government sector (e.g. non-
profit, church) is higher, and these are stated in the budget on
a net basis, only up to the extent of the government subsidy
they receive. In order to eliminate this distorting impact, we
net the expenditure side with all sales and fee revenues (as if
all institutions were outside the government sector)
5. In
Hungary, the amount of sales and fee revenues exceeds the V3
average by 0.8% of GDP.
All in all, after the basic adjustments of the 10.1 percentage
points surplus extra expenditure existing in relation to the
unadjusted expenditures in Hungary, we are left with 5.7
percentage points, while – if we also carry out the
supplementary adjustments – the Hungarian extra
expenditure compared to the regional average will be 4.1
percentage points (Table 4). At the same time, it is important
to emphasise that while the basic adjustments may be
performed explicitly, the supplementary adjustments prevail
only subject to certain assumptions. How should this
difference be interpreted?
This difference may interpreted as follows: if we reduce our
primary expenditure to the V3 average by taking into account
the difference justifiable on the basis of the sales and fee
revenues and the usage of EU funds, then a net (taking into
account directly and indirectly lost tax revenues) reduction,
equalling 4.1 % of GDP, of the deficit may be achieved.
6
COMPARABLE STRUCTURE OF
EXPENDITURES – DO WE SPEND ON
OPERATIONS, TRANSFERS OR
INVESTMENTS?
So far we have assumed that the 2007 average adjusted
primary expenditure of the Visegrád countries examined is
an appropriate benchmark for Hungary. However, it is worth
performing further analysis of the differences in the
expenditure structure. As we mentioned in the introduction,
2007 was a good choice in terms of the cycle’s impact on
expenditures, but we did not examine whether, for example,
the fluctuation of capital expenditures distorted the
comparison. Studying the structure of expenditures may be
all the more justified, because due to the adjustments
proposed so far, we may presumably obtain a more
differentiated picture, not only of the expenditure level, but
also of the expenditure structure. In this section, we inspect
the impact of the proposed adjustments on the expenditure
structure, with the exception of impact of net EU funds. This
is because the subsidies received from the EU cannot be
reliably broken down into capital and current items. For the
sake of simplicity, we examine the total capital transfer
received by the general government (which also contains the
part of the EU subsidy classified as a capital transfer).
In this section, we examine the primary expenditure structure
in a relatively consolidated manner (Table 5). First of all, we
take the wage and intermediate consumption together, since
within this range of operating expenditure the level of
“outsourcing” of former government employees (e.g.
technical personnel) and their financing via intermediate
consumption (i.e. purchase of goods and services) is
incidental in each country.
It is justified to examine the ESA operating expenditures
together with the social benefits provided via the market
producers, as the ratio of institutions classified within and
outside the general government is different.
7 These two items
roughly correspond to the consumption provided to the
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5This technical assumption prevails anyway, thus this adjustment is similar to the basic adjustment.
6 At the same time, due to the higher debt and interest expenses, Hungary must realise a higher primary surplus than the other Visegrád countries examined.
7The result of this previously mentioned problem is that sales and fee revenues are higher in certain countries (see table 4) (e.g. in Hungary), and lower in other
countries (e.g. in Slovakia). Where these revenues are lower, presumably more institutions outside the general government require financing, and a dominant part of
this is realised via the social transfers in kind provided via market producers. A smaller part of this financing may appear in corporate subsidies, e.g. as the subsidies
granted to transport firms.community (collective consumption) and the households,
which, for the sake of simplicity, we refer to in the table as
consumption, transfers in kind. Before the adjustments, this
category exceeds the V3 average in Hungary by 3.6% of
GDP. When making the adjustment, we also deduct the sales
and fee revenues from expenditures – similarly to the direct
tax content – and then consolidate it with the subsidy of
market producers providing social transfers in kind. In order
to eliminate the impact of consumption by government
employees on tax revenues, we reduce this consolidated
expenditure with the indirect impact appearing in the
consumption taxes. Based on this, the expenditure of
Hungary thus calculated exceeds the V3 average only by
0.4% of GDP.
In the case of corporate subsidies, both unadjusted and
adjusted figures show a surplus of 1.1 percentage points.
However, we do not know how much of this difference is
attributable to the financing of firms providing public
services (e.g. transport firms) and how much to the support
of firms not providing public services. That is, the former
should be stated – due to their similarity – together with
social transfers in kind.
Another expenditure item explaining the significant
difference is household transfers in cash, where the
unadjusted expenditures exceed the average by 2.3% of GDP.
In this case as well, we first deduct the primary tax content
(this is sizeable in Poland), then we adjust the consumption
taxes originating from the spending of transfers. Hungary’s
departure from the average is the highest for this
expenditure, since the adjusted transfer is higher by 2.5% of
GDP.
The last factor of the discrepancy is capital expenditure,
which may explain only a minor part of the total difference.
We adjust this expenditure by the primary tax content and
the capital transfers received from outside the general
government. These latter revenues finance government
investments; a major part of this is EU subsidy. If we compare
the adjusted capital expenditure, Hungary’s expenditure
exceeds the V3 average only by 0.2% of GDP. This may be
explained by a number of factors.
8 For example, in addition
to the investments and investment-financing capital transfers,
there are also capital injections for debt assumptions. They
appear as sizeable one-off payments, usually in election years
in Hungary.
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2007 (as percentage of GDP) original data SK PL CZ V3 HU HU–V3
1. Primary expenditure = 2+3+4+5 33.2 39.6 41.5 38.1 45.8 7.7
2. Consumption (transfers in kind) = 2a.+ 2b. 15.9 17.6 19.1 17.5 21.1 3.6
2 a. Operational (wage + intermediate cons.) 
expenditure 11.4 15.6 13.8 13.6 18.2 4.6
2 b. Social transfers via market producers 4.5 2.0 5.3 3.9 2.9 -1.0
3. Transfers to the corporate sector 
+ other subsidies 2.8 2.8 3.2 2.9 4.0 1.1
4. Transfers to households in cash 11.6 14.2 12.9 12.9 15.2 2.3
5. Capital expenditure 3.0 4.8 6.3 4.7 5.5 0.8
Table 5
Economic grouping
2007 (as percentage of GDP) adjusted data SK PL CZ V3 HU HU–V3
1. Adjusted primary expenditure = +2+3+4+5+6 27.7 26.2 30.8 28.2 32.4 4.1
2. Consumption – sales. primary and indirect tax 
content 11.1 9.1 10.7 10.3 10.7 0.4
3. Transfers to the corporate sector 
+ other subsidies 2.8 2.8 3.2 2.9 4.0 1.1
4. Transfers to households in cash – primary and 
indirect tax  10.9 8.9 11.4 10.4 12.9 2.5
5. Capital expenditure – primary tax content 2.4 4.6 4.6 3.9 4.1 0.2
6. Errors (e.g. non-adjustment with EU items) 
= +1–2–3–4–5 0.5 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.7 -0.1
8 At the same time, the level of investments must be also considered. While in the V3 investments in 2007 were identical with the 2004-2006 average level, investments in
Hungary were 0.4 percentage point lower. If Hungary had an “average year” as well, the difference could have been 0.6 percentage point, instead of 0.2 percentage point.COMPARABLE STRUCTURE OF
EXPENDITURES – DO WE SPEND ON
EDUCATION, HEALTHCARE OR SOCIAL
PROTECTION?
Up to now we have compared the expenditure structure
according to the so-called economic breakdown. As
mentioned, depending on the statistical classification of the
providers a certain type of social benefit is recorded in the
government statistics either as wage and intermediate
consumption of non-market providers or as subsidy to
market providers.
This type of distortion is partially corrected by the functional
grouping
9 of expenditure, which reports, for example,
educational or healthcare spending, irrespective of whether
they were provided as wage and intermediate consumption
or as subsidy.
Thanks to the fact that the economic breakdown is also
preserved in the functional grouping, we may perform
adjustments in the functional breakdown as well by the
primary and indirect tax content of wages, and the primary
tax content of intermediate consumption (i.e. purchase of
goods and services). However, the sales and fee revenues are
not available in this grouping for all countries, and thus this
comparison is less accurate (Table 6).
Based on unadjusted figures the highest – almost 
5-percentage point – difference between Hungary and V3
occurs is detected in general public services. On the other
hand, the adjustment is the highest at this function, as a result
of which two-thirds of the difference disappears. The main
underlying reason for this is the fact that interest spending we
have eliminated is included in this function. Another reason
is that wage spending is dominant within the primary
expenditures of this function, where – as we pointed out
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9 Classification of the functions of government (COFOG).
2007 unadjusted figures  SK PL CZ V3 HU HU–V3
(as a percentage of GDP)
General Public services 3.7 5.5 4.4 4.5 9.4 4.9
Defence 1.5 1.4 1.2 1.4 1.3 -0.1
Public order and safety 2.0 1.8 2.1 2.0 2.0 0.0
Economic affairs 4.3 4.6 6.9 5.3 6.6 1.3
Environment protection 0.6 0.6 1.0 0.7 0.7 0.0
Housing and community amenities 0.8 1.1 1.1 1.0 1.0 0.0
Health 6.5 4.6 7.1 6.1 4.9 -1.2
Recreation, culture and religion 0.7 1.1 1.3 1.0 1.5 0.5
Education 4.0 5.7 4.7 4.8 5.3 0.5
Social protection 10.6 15.8 12.9 13.1 17.3 4.2
Table 6
Functional grouping
(unadjusted and adjusted figures)
2007 adjusted figures (as a percentage of GDP) SK PL CZ V3 HU HU–V3
General Public services 1.5    2.4   2.3    2.1   3.6     1.5
Defence 1.0 1.0 0.8 0.9 0.9 -0.1
Public order and safety 1.2 1.2 1.1 1.1 1.0 -0.2
Economic affairs 3.9 4.2 6.0 4.7 5.7 1.0
Environment protection 0.5 0.5 0.8 0.6 0.6 0.0
Housing and community amenities 0.7 0.9 1.0 0.9 0.8 0.0
Health 6.9 4.0 7.0 6.0 3.9 -2.1
Recreation, culture and religion 0.5 0.9 1.1 0.8 1.1 0.3
Education 2.5 3.8 2.7 3.0 3.1 0.1
Social protection 9.0 9.8 10.9 9.9 14.2 4.3previously – the different tax rate generates significant
discrepancies.
The remaining 1.6-percentage point difference could, in part,
be explained by the differing amounts of sales and fee
revenues, but we cannot establish its impact accurately for
lack of the V3 figures. In Hungary, these fee revenues exceed
1% of GDP; if this is higher than the V3 average, then it also
explains, at least in part, the higher expenditure. However,
the difference may be caused by other factors as well. For
example, excessive decentralisation is not optimal in terms of
economies of scale. From among transition countries, the
number of municipalities, relative to the population, is the
second highest in Hungary, i.e. the average size of
municipalities is small (Dabla–Norris–Wade 2002). At the
same time, as a result of the layoffs implemented recently,
employment in public administration cannot be considered
high in international comparison. 4% of the population of
the economically active age-group works in public
administration, which slightly falls short of the EU average,
and even among the Visegrád countries the proportion of
public administration employees is lower only in Poland.
In the case of the economic activities function, unadjusted
and adjusted Hungarian expenditure exceeds the V3 average
by 1.3% and 1% of GDP, respectively. The function is
dominated by consumption and investment expenditure, and
thus the adjustments are primarily attributable to the
difference in the indirect tax content (VAT). The role of wage
spending within the differences is not significant compared to
general public services, and thus the tax content thereof – to
be eliminated – is also negligible. Within this function, about
two-thirds of spending is represented by transport
expenditure, and in the case of Hungary the transfers granted
to MÁV are also stated here.
Healthcare expenditures are the only function where
Hungary spent significantly (by 1.2% of GDP) less than other
countries in the region. Moreover, the adjustments almost
double this difference. The difference is distributed unevenly
in the three dimensions of healthcare. First, subsidies for
pharmaceuticals in Hungary still exceeded the Czech and
Polish level slightly. Furthermore, in the case of sickness
benefits, if we also consider employer contribution as an
adjustment, then its ratio to GDP in Slovakia significantly
exceeds that of the other regional countries.
10 However,
operation and investment in the healthcare scheme represents
the highest expenditure. Hungary’s shortfall in this area is
even more apparent after the adjustments. One of the reasons
for this is that while in Poland and Hungary about 1.5% of
GDP represents the wage expenditure of healthcare
employees, which falls to 0.8% and 0.7% of GDP,
respectively, after the primary and indirect taxes are
deducted, in the Czech Republic and Slovakia the ratio of
wage spending is a mere 0.1-0.2% of GDP. The low wage
spending can be explained by the fact that the ratio of
healthcare institutions classified outside the government
sector (e.g. non-profit) is high, which appear among public
expenditures in the form of net subsidy reduced by sales and
user-fee revenues. These sales and fee revenues in Hungary
account for 0.6% of GDP, which probably exceeds the V3
average. This means the extent of underfunding is even larger
in Hungary. In parallel with the low level of operating
expenditure, the level of investments has been too low for
quite a long period already. The studies dealing with the
condition of Hungarian healthcare infrastructure
unanimously stress the low quality of the healthcare scheme
– decrepit infrastructure, obsolete equipment, high degree of
amortisation
11 – and the insufficiency of healthcare capacities
(Papp–Eöry, 2004; Bondár, 2000; KSH, 2007). Capital
shortage
12 in healthcare is also well demonstrated by the low
per capita number of medical equipment of high
technological quality (CT, MRI). (source: OECD Health
data, 2007). According to Papp–Eöry (2004), a one-off
expenditure amounting to 2% percent of GDP would be
required for the modernisation of hospital infrastructure
alone (buildings, machines, equipment, public utilities).
13
In the case of the educational function, the Hungarian
expenditure exceeds the V3 average by 0.5% of GDP, but
after the adjustment this difference disappears. The function
is dominated by wage expenditures and the adjustments are
also related to this cost element. It should be noted that,
similarly to healthcare, even the adjusted level of wage
spending in Poland and Hungary significantly exceeds that of
the two other countries, which may be explained by the
different institutional structure in this case as well, i.e. the
different ratio of institutions outside the general government
sector. In Hungary the sales and fee revenues increase
revenues and expenditure by 0.4% of GDP, i.e. taking this
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10That is, the unadjusted figures support the view reflected in several analyses that healthcare in Hungary is underfunded, which is unfavourable in terms of long-term
growth, and which could be one of the reasons for the poor health figures in Hungary. At the same time, lifestyle and diets also influence health indicators, but the
examination of this is beyond the scope of our analysis.
11 “In 2006 69% of medical equipment, 70% of hospital technical equipment and 86% of IT equipment were depreciated to zero”. KSH (2007)
12The national and international literature typically use the number of MRI and CT equipment – in the lack of other indicators providing a more aggregate picture – for
measuring capital adequacy, which functions as a proxy variable.
13 In terms of healthcare investments, it is important to consider that in the 2007–2013 EU financial planning period significant EU development funds are available for
healthcare developments.also into account, on a net basis we presumably spend less on
education than the V3 average.
In Hungary, the expenditures of educational institutions are
primarily dominated by current expenditures, while
investments represent only less than 5% of total
expenditures. Wages and contributions accounts for about
85% of current expenditures.
Based on the unadjusted figures, Hungary spent by 4.2
percentage points more on social protection than the
regional average, and this difference remains after the
adjustments as well (4.3%). The social protection function
includes – in addition to pensions – the family allowances and
the unemployment benefits as well.
Among the adjustment factors, the indirect tax content of
transfers – i.e. the VAT and excise tax paid on spending the
transfers – and negative tax affect the expenditure level of
each country. During the adjustment process, indirect tax
reduces the unadjusted expenditure level, while negative tax
– i.e. tax allowances granted to families – increases it in
Slovakia. In Poland – exclusively in the region – pension
expenditure is burdened by income tax and contribution
payment, thus, the negative adjustment is outstandingly high
in Poland among the region’s countries.
In the case of the social protection function, 60% of the
significant discrepancy from the V3 average (2.5% of GDP)
appeared in the form of the households’ transfer in cash (See
Table 5); of this pension expenditure is higher by 1.5% of
GDP in Hungary on the one hand, and on the other hand the
family and child allowance is higher by 1.1%. The other one-
third of the difference is attributable the higher social
transfers in kind provided via market producers and less than
one-tenth is explained by the higher operational expenditure
of the government used for social protection.
Pension expenditure is the largest item within the social
protection function in each country; therefore, it is worth
examining the factors explaining the discrepancy in this item
in detail.
Among the Visegrád countries, pensions in Poland are subject
to tax payment, and thus the four countries’ tax expenditure
may be compared only after deducting the income tax and
social insurance contribution paid on pensions.
14 Even after
deducting the primary tax content of pensions, the per capita
pension expenditure is still the highest in Poland among the
Visegrád countries. The comparison further changes, if in
addition to primary taxes we also deduct the indirect taxes.
After all adjustments, the pension expenditure as percentage
of GDP is the highest in Hungary (Table 7). Pension
expenditure as percentage of GDP depends on three factors:
the ratio of pensioners, the per capita pension and the
relative income level of the country. According to our simple
calculation (see box text), pension expenditure in Hungary
was higher than the V3 average primarily because the per
capita pension expenditure exceeds the regional average, and
at the same time – under a comparable structure – the ratio
of pensioners also exceeds that of the other countries, while
the per capita GDP was similar in all four countries.
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14 In our analysis, pension expenditure includes – in addition to old-age pensions – the disability pension and survivors’ pensions as well. We examine the number of
pensioners in line with this.
Pension expenditure (as percentage of GDP) SK PL CZ V3 HU HU–V3
Original 7.3 12.4 8.4 9.4 10.0 0.6
Adjusted with primary taxes 7.3 10.3 8.4 8.7 10.0 1.3
Adjusted 6.1 7.6 7.2 7.0 8.4 1.5
Table 7
Discrepancy in pension expenses (2006)MAGYAR NEMZETI BANK
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The factors influencing the level of the pension-to-GDP ratio can be
broken down as follows:
,where   is the pension-to-GDP-ratio,  
is the pension per pensioner (EUR/year),   is the ratio of 
pensioners to the total population and   is the per capita GDP.
Based on this formula, pension expenditure as a percentage of GDP is
generated by dividing the per capita pension expenditure by the per
capita GDP. The per capita pension expenditure is the pension per
pensioner multiplied by the ratio of pensioners to the total population.
Let us analyse the factors one by one.
a) The ratio of pensioners cannot be compared easily, because in
Hungary, Slovakia and the Czech Republic pensioners may receive two
types of benefits, e.g. old-age pension as a primary benefit and widow’s
pension as a supplementary benefit, while this is not permitted in
Poland where pensioners have to chose between survivors’pension or
old-age pension. In Hungary, this overlap is presented using specific
figures, while no data of such kind are available for Slovakia and the
Czech Republic. Accordingly, it is possible to compare properly either
the Polish figures to the Hungarian figures excluding the overlap (HU1)
or the figures of Slovakia and the Czech Republic to the Hungarian
figures including the overlap (HU2).
The ratio of pensioners to the total population is basically determined
by three factors. These are the effective age of old-age retirement,
which – apart from the statutory retirement age – may be significantly
influenced by the regulation of early retirement, the country’s age
pyramid and finally the regulations pertaining to disability and
survivors’ pension. The effective retirement age in all countries under
review was around 60 and the difference between the countries was
negligible. As far as the age pyramid is concerned, in the Czech Republic
and Hungary the ratio of the 60-year old population is above 20%, while
in Poland and Slovakia this index is around 17%. We compare the ratio
of non-old age pensioners among the countries by assessing the
number of pensioners exceeding the number of pensioners above 60,
with due regard to the fact that the effective retirement age in all
countries is 60 years (+/- a few months).
b) Based on the comparison excluding the overlap, the Hungarian per
capita pension, calculated in euro – adjusted for the primary tax
content – exceeds that of Poland, while on the basis of the
comparison including the overlap, the Czech Republic has the highest
pension per pensioner.
The difference slightly decreases if we calculate the per capita
expenditure at purchasing power parity, i.e. we also take into account
the price of the average consumer basket. With this method we also
eliminate the impact of the different indirect taxes, i.e. VAT and excise
tax. Calculating at purchasing power parity, pension payments in
Poland and Slovakia lag behind those in Hungary by 14% and 16%,
respectively, due to the lower price level. At the same time, due to the
higher price level, the Czech expenditures exceed the expenditures of
Hungary only by 4%.
c) Based on the formula, the pension-to-GDP ratio and the per capita
GDP are related to each other as follows: by itself, the higher the latter
is, the lower the former will be. The per capita GDP in Hungary in 2006
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Box 1: Factors determining pension-to-GDP ratio
PL  HU 1*  HU 2*  CZ  SK 
1. Proportion of pensioners  relative to total 
population 24.0 27.5  33.9 33.1 26.8
old-age pension 61  75  61  61  63
o/w  receiving disability pension 18  16  13  18  13
survivor’s pension 22  9  26  22  24 
2. Rate of 60 years old or older population (per cent) 17.8 21.7  21.7 20.9 16.5 
3. Difference (1–2)  6.2  5.8  12.2  12.2  10.3
* A HU 1 contains only those pensioners who receive widow pension as primary allowance while HU2 contains supplementary beneficiaries too.
HU 1 will allways be compared to Poland only, while HU 2 to the Czech Republic and Slovakia.
PL  HU 1*  HU 2*  CZ  SK 
P/NP 2.3 2.7 2.2  2.4 1.8 
P/NP  on purchasing power parity  4.0  4.6  3.9  4.0  3.3 
P/NP (HU = 100)  83  100  100  110  81 
P/NP on purchasing power parity 86  100  100  104  84 EXPENDITURE STRUCTURE IN TWO
ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES
Expenditures may be broken down not only by their form
(economic grouping) and purpose (functional grouping), as
the literature also examines other alternative breakdowns.
One of these alternative approaches (Kneller et al. 1999)
divides expenditures into two groups. The so-called
productive expenditures include, for example, education,
healthcare and transport, while unproductive expenditures
include social spending and pensions. Productive
expenditures exceed the unproductive welfare expenditures
in all countries, with the exception of Hungary. The average
difference is 4 percentage points. By contrast, the level of
unproductive expenditures was higher in Hungary. Based on
the adjusted figures, the productive expenditure-to-GDP
ratio in Hungary is even lower than the regional average.
Based on the original figures, in addition to Hungary, welfare
expenditures also exceeded productive ones in Poland, since
welfare spending include the tax content of pensions in the
unadjusted figures; however productive expenditures were
higher after adjustment. Within productive expenditures,
healthcare expenditure is lower by 2% in Hungary than in
the V3 countries, while economic activities exceed the V3
average by 1 percentage point, and Hungary spends the same
amount relative to GDP on education (See Chart 1).
A comparison of productive and unproductive expenditures
reveals that despite the adjustment, any conclusions must be
treated with great caution. Productive expenditures include
economic subsidies which often contributes to the survival of
outdated structures, thus their contribution to growth is
more negative. On the other hand, according to empirical
results, the impact of social transfers is often positive on long-
term growth. One possible explanation for this is the
reduction of income inequality and cyclical income
fluctuation, but in terms of the final impact the distribution
of age groups may also be dominant.
Another alternative approach (Rangel, 2000) considers some
of the above-mentioned aspects by calculating the
distribution of net expenditures among age groups. Based on
the distribution of the adjusted figures and healthcare
expenditures in Hungary (Gál et al. 2008), we estimated the
amount of these items: the relevant results are shown in
Chart 2. The beneficiaries of one type of net expenditures are
the young who are not yet active in the labour market. They
receive family allowances, education and some healthcare
services, while the state receives tax revenues on their
consumption. Young people also benefit the most from fixed
asset (capital) formation (Chart 2, green column). The other
type of net expenditures targets the elderly, an economically
no longer active age-group; this includes pensions and part of
healthcare. Elderly people pay tax on their consumption (in
certain countries on pension) (Chart 2, red column). If we
calculate both groups’ revenue-expenditure balance, the
remainder may – for the sake of simplicity – be allocated to
the active age-group. Here, part of the healthcare and welfare
expenditures stand against significant tax payments, and the
costs of collective consumption also recorded here. Based on
the balance of these, the active age group is a net payer
(Chart 2, yellow column). In Rangel’s analytical framework
interest spending is expenditure linked to the past, while a
deficit is a burden postponed until some future date. In very
simplified terms, this means that interest is received by the
elderly age group, while the debt generated by the deficit will
be repaid by young people. Since the volume of interest
spending and the size of the deficit were approximately the
same in the Visegrád countries in 2007, this item may be
considered directly as reallocation between elderly and young
people (Chart 2 – blue column).
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Chart 1
Productive and unproductive expenditures
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Chart 2
Distribution of net expenditures among age groups










SK PL CZ HU
Older Young Active DeficitThese results show that in the case of Hungary higher net
pensions are mostly compensated by the lower healthcare
expenditures (assuming that the weight of elderly people
within healthcare expenditures is similar in all countries).
Accordingly, net expenditures targeted towards the elderly
in Hungary exceed the V3 average by 0.3% of GDP. Net
expenditures directed towards young people exceed the
average by 2.2% of GDP, but this is paid not by the active
age group, rather it becomes the debt of young people. As
in the case of Hungary the deficit exceeds the V3 average by
3.3% of GDP, net expenditures – adjusted for this –
targeted at young people fall behind the average by 1.1% of
GDP. In other words, if we ignore the deficit, in the V3
countries higher net expenditures are directed towards
elderly people than towards young people, while in
Hungary it is just the opposite. (Similarly to the Czech
Republic, the ratio of the population below 20 and above
60 years is identical in Hungary as well, while in Poland and
Slovakia the number of young people exceeds that of
elderly people by 30% and 40%, respectively.) If we deduct
the deficit from young people’s net expenditures, we find
that it is the elderly people who receive higher benefits in
Hungary as well. One should emphasize however, that even
this breakdown of expenditures fails to provide any
information on the how efficiently the individual countries
use their funds. Thus, for example, the same amount of
investment may be either poorly or well targeted
(elimination of bottlenecks).
CONCLUSIONS
The objective of our analysis was to compare the level and
structure of the expenditures of the four Visegrád countries.
We found that the expenditure of Hungary and the average
of the other three Visegrád countries in 2007 differed by
10% of GDP, but one quarter of this is attributable to higher
interest spending and one-third to revenue factors. These
revenue factors increase revenues and expenditures
simultaneously, and thus in fact they have no impact on the
deficit. Therefore, for example, the fact that the tax content
of public expenditures is very different in the individual
countries is neutral in terms of the deficit, but it still distorts
the comparison of expenditure levels. The sales and fee
revenues collected directly by public institutions to cover
expenditures similarly hinder comparability. Finally, the
subsidies received from the EU also “flow through” revenues
and expenditures without impacting the balance. The role of
the latter two factors is also different in the countries under
review, thus the adjustment has an impact on the difference
of expenditure levels.
Examining the impact of adjustments within the expenditure
structure, it can be shown that almost two-thirds of the
approximately 4-percentage point difference in the GDP
ratio exists in the transfers of households in cash, mostly in
the case of pensions, and to a lesser extent in the case of
family allowances. Compared to the average of Visegrád
countries, Hungary spends more on general public services
and on economic (e.g. public transport) subsidies, and
considerably less on the current and capital spending of
healthcare institutions. However, our results do not provide
information on the quality, efficiency and targeted nature of
the expenditures; examination of those aspects goes beyond
the scope of our analysis.
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GLOSSARY
Tax base: in the article we refer to the potential basis of
taxes (e.g. wage bill, investment expenditure, etc.) – which is
taxable in principle- as the tax base. We do not deal with the
exceptions stipulated in the tax laws of the individual
countries. The effect of the specific tax base exemptions
contributes to the fact that the effective tax rate is lower than
the nominal (statutory) tax rate stipulated in the law.
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¸Tax content: The extent of the taxes and contributions
actually paid by the general government or households.
Tax rate: The actual tax content divided by the potential tax
base; it indicates the effective tax burden.
Direct tax: In the article the personal income tax and
contributions are allocated to this category.
Indirect tax: In the article VAT, excise duty and vehicle
registration tax are included in this category.
Primary tax content: The total of the direct taxes paid on
the general government’s wage bill and the indirect tax
content of government procurements.
Indirect tax content: The indirect tax paid on consumption
by the government employees and persons benefiting from
household transfers in cash.
Household transfer in cash: Pension expenditure, family
allowance, social and unemployment benefits paid in cash.
Household transfer in kind: The educational, healthcare
and welfare services used by the individual members of the
population, provided by the general government through its
own institutions (schools, hospitals) or institutions classifying
as market producers.
Social transfers provided via market producers: Part of
the social benefits is provided by institutions other than
general government institutions. Thus, for example, price
subsidies (medicine, gas) are provided by the government via
companies. Part of the healthcare and educational institutions
is also outside the general government, e.g. in the form of
non-profit companies.
Collective consumption: Consumption expenditures of
public administration, defence and public order, which cover
the services provided by the general government to all
households.
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